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ABSTRACT 
 Navy watchstanders are ill-equipped to monitor network status in real time, to 
include an inability to identify network anomalies and potential risks on-the-fly. This 
leads to a lack of situational awareness and ultimately an inability to determine the 
current network risk level. An existing unsupervised machine learning technique is 
identified and leveraged to enable the detection of anomalous DNS network traffic on a 
shore-based unclassified Navy network. The research conducted by the team outlines an 
architecture that could be extended to produce a capability to provide the watchstander a 
near real-time metric of a subset of the risk that the network is experiencing by 
classifying DNS traffic anomalies. 
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1.1 Navy’s Cyber Vision1
"Our Navy will protect America from attack, promote American prosperity, and preserve
America’s strategic influence. U.S. naval operations—from the seafloor to space, from the
blue water to the littorals, and in the information domain—will deter aggression and enable
resolution of crises on terms acceptable to the United States and our allies and partners" [1].
This is part of the mission statement that was promulgated by Admiral John M. Richardson,
prior Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in A Design For Maintaining Maritime Superiority.
From this statement one can gather that now, more than ever, the information domain plays
a vital role in protecting our country. Within the information domain falls the cyber domain
and Fleet Cyber Command (FCC)/Commander 10th Fleet (C10F) have been charged with
defending and delivering effects in and through cyberspace. From Fleet Cyber Command’s
(FCC) command page, part of their mission is to "conduct operations in and through
cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and space to ensure Navy and Joint/Coalition
freedom of action and decision superiority while denying the same to our adversaries" [2].
FCC and Commander 10th Fleet (C10F) are co-located in Fort Meade, MD, and also have
a dual-hatted commander.
1.2 FCC/C10F Tasking1
In 2018, then FCC/C10F Chief of Staff (COS) Captain James Mills directed the N9 to head
up research on visualization of data, Human Computer Interactions (HCI), and identify the
most efficientway to display network health and status to awatchstander and decision-maker.
Specific guidance included:
1. Using the Integrated Navy Operations Support System (INOSS) architectural frame-
work, evaluate existing software tools for deployment to Department of Defense
1This section is a collaborative effort among multiple thesis students working on the same C10F funded
project. The thoughts, ideas, and information contained within are not attributed to a single individual and
can be found in the theses referenced in the subsections under Section 1.2.
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Information Network - Navy (DODIN-N) watch floors, Network Operation Cen-
ters (NOCs), and for use by afloat Information Technology (IT) personnel.
2. Take into account industry and other government implementations, best practices,
and employment of similar systems.
3. Integrate existing and novelmalicious activity notifications into the INOSS framework
to allow appropriate personnel the freedom to quarantine and investigate the activity.
4. Identify how these tools will support existing Navy programs of record.
This led to the funding for Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) research to be conducted by
thesis students. Dr. Dan Boger was appointed as the project manager; Dr. Boger then
selected students with skill sets that aligned with the requirements of the aforementioned
research. The students, their thesis topics, and their respective deliverables are described in
the following subsections.
1.2.1 Architecting Autonomous Actions in Navy Enterprise Networks
Dr. Dan Boger and Dr. Luqi are co-thesis advisors for Lieutenant Max Geiszler. This
thesis investigates Navy Enterprise Networks (NENs) in an attempt to better understand
the fundamental operation of the Navy’s networks. The main idea behind the research is
to explain how NENs can conduct Network Operations (NETOPS) to meet unique Navy
mission sets and ensure adequate information is given to higher up organizations. The
investigation covers some of the use-cases in which the Navy has an intensive need for
human-driven processes to accomplish necessary critical tasks. It also explores where man-
hours are being inefficiently spent due to process redundancy and limited human watch-
stander proficiency. It then suggests a technical architectural change to NEN infrastructure
utilizing the INOSS framework which helps to facilitate automated solutions to problems
which have been presented by FCC/C10F, and also suggests a change to tightly integrate
Development Operations (DEVOPS) in operational processes.
1.2.2 Network Traffic Anomaly Detection on a Navy Network
Dr. John Monaco is the thesis advisor for Lieutenant Mike Laws and Lieutenant Greg
Bunder. This thesis determines the viability of using existing unsupervised machine learn-
ing techniques to detect anomalous network traffic from an unclassified Navy network.
Upon completion, this thesis gives a recommendation as to whether unsupervised machine
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learning can be used for anomaly detection. Detailed analysis of implemented features that
are most effective for anomaly detection, along with any lessons learned and obstacles met
during research, are provided. Lastly, this thesis addresses what an architecture might look
like that would be used to implement network anomaly detection via unsupervised Machine
Learning (ML) within the INOSS framework.
1.2.3 Visualization: Functional and Conceptual Approach to Network
Operations
Dr. Dan Boger is the thesis advisor for Commander Henry Lee Bush. The thesis analyzes
the current visualization at various organizations, the private sector, and the public sector,
to better understand how visualization provides a network’s health and status. The main
idea behind the thesis is to evaluate visualization in key focus areas: single pane of glass,
information immersion, information framework, and information concept. It does this by
covering case studies that were done through the site observation to identify how information
is collected, processed, analyzed, and visualized to support command and control of the
network. Through the case studies, the thesis also reviews the information not captured
because of stovepiped systems, limited sharedmanagement information, andmanual process
which reduces the information in visualization. The information not captured in turn impacts
situation awareness and decision making which negatively impacts command and control of
the network. The thesis recommends the use of the INOSS functional framework to improve
processes to support visualization of information and information immersion through space
design. Lastly, it introduces an information management concept to support command and
control of the network.
1.2.4 How Information Sharing Affects Network Operations
Dr. Dan Boger is the thesis advisor for Lieutenant Eva Castillo. Effective information
sharing between various components are crucial to FCC/C10F successfully and efficiently
meeting the mission. The thesis has two goals. The primary goal is to examine whether
existing information systems, mandates, policies, or Service Level Agreements (SLAs)
are limiting information sharing within the FCC/C10F organization. The secondary goal
is to seek technical and non-technical solutions to support current and evolving require-
ments. The thesis will evaluate solutions studied that can positively impact information
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sharing for the organization. Research approaches include interviews and observations in
academia, civilian IT sector, defense organizations, programs of record, and Tier 1, 2 and
3 providers. From the research gathered, conclusions were drawn to the effectiveness of
current technologies, mandates, and policies along with proposed solutions.
1.3 Scope and Contributions
The Navy currently uses Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and Intrusion Prevention
Systems (IPSs) to protect its networks. These IDSs and IPSs use human-enabled rules to
filter, detect, and prevent anomalous activity. The rules are only as good as the person
writing them and their knowledge of the network. Similar limitations exist for supervised
machine learning as it also requires human labeling. An unsupervisedmodel, when properly
created, has the potential to not require human intervention to accomplish the same results.
The Navy also uses a suite of disparate and aging tools to gain situational awareness of
events that occur within the network boundaries. The average watchstander tasked with
maintaining access to these tools often does not possess the requisite ability or time to
collate the information that is contained within. The inability to process, decide, and act
has serious ramifications within the commanders’ decision cycle.
This thesis will examine the viability of detecting anomalous unclassified Domain Name
System (DNS) traffic from an individual Navy network. Depending on the role of the
command that uses the network, traffic can look very different. For example, traffic from an
Arleigh Burke Destroyer can look very different from traffic from a shore installation or the
NPS network, but given any Destroyer, one could suppose that traffic would be relatively
similar. This is due to many variables such as the equipment on board, number of personnel,
and mission set. During this process, we will also determine an extensible architecture that
can be integrated within the INOSS framework. Specific excluded areas include classified
networks and large ashore or afloat networks.
1.4 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 provides background context for the reader to better understand the methodology
and results that are presented in later chapters. It includes an overview of what Artificial
Intelligence (AI) and ML are, the different types of ML, a detailed description of network
4
anomalies, and how ML and network anomalies relate. Background is given on some
related research that has previously been conducted using ML to detect network anomalies.
Chapter 3 outlines the specific methodology that was used to conduct the research. It
explains the process from the collection of network data through an overview of feature
generation.
Chapter 4 elaborates on the code utilized to extract features, run the ML algorithm, and
ultimately score anomalies found within the network traffic.
Chapter 5 provides a detailed analysis of the results obtained from the ML algorithm.
Chapter 6 begins with a brief description of the current architecture that Navy networks fall
under. This is followed by a description of how the methods employed within the thesis
could be used to fit into the existing Navy architecture.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. Alongwith the conclusion, lessons learned and opportunities
for future work are provided.
5





Exactly when the first example of ML was introduced, and by whom, is somewhat ambigu-
ous, but the concept has been around since at least as early as the late 1940s. In a lecture
given to the London Mathematical Society in February 1947, it was postulated by none
other than Alan Turing, regarded by many as a founding father of AI, that "what we want is
a machine that can learn from experience" [3]. Turing’s work laid the groundwork for AI,
and by proxy ML, as we know it today.
So, what is ML and how exactly does it relate to AI? AI is loosely defined as "the branch
of computer science that is concerned with the automation of intelligent behavior" [4].
Intelligent behavior, in this case, would be behavior that mimics a human being’s ability
to learn and apply concepts and skills. Contained within the overarching field of AI is
ML, which like AI, is the automation of intelligent behavior. However, what sets ML apart
is that it is not explicitly programmed to do so; hence the term "learning." Rather than
predefined parameters to provide intelligence, the intelligence is instead learned. Intelligent
behavior can be mimicked by a savvy programmer willing to put in the time and effort
but ML is distinct in its ability to learn from inferences and not solely from the underlying
programming. Also contained within AI, but not relevant for the purposes of understanding
the work presented in this thesis, is deep learning, a further subset of ML. Figure 2.1




A program that can sense, 
reason, act, and adapt
MACHINE LEARNING
Algorithms whose performance 
improve as they are exposed to 
more data over time
DEEP LEARNING
Subset of machine learning in 
which  multilayered neural 
networks learn from vast 
amounts of data
Figure 2.1. Depiction of Relationships of AI and Subsets. Source: [5].
ML can be further separated by the type of learning algorithms involved. The three
main categories are supervised, semi-supervised, and unsupervised. Figure 2.2 shows the
relationship between the three main categories of algorithms and how the outputted models
differ based on the type and composition of the training data that the algorithm is applied
to. For example, an unsupervised ML algorithm would be run on all unlabeled data and
this would generate an unsupervised ML model.
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Figure 2.2. Machine Learning Models. Source: [6].
A dataset within ML is broken up into two or three groups depending on the programmer.
The first group of data will always be the training dataset. The general rule of thumb is to
use seventy percent of the data to train with and is what the model will learn on. The other
thirty percent can be used as one set of data for validation and testing or it can be further
divvied up into twenty percent for validation and ten percent of testing data. Validation
occurs after the initial training and is used to fine-tune the model. The test set is applied last
and is used to determine the effectiveness and performance of the model. The ML pipeline
can then be broken into phases that correspond to the dataset groups.
The input into a ML model are features. These can be generated by a human or, in the case
of deep learning, by the machine. Features are characteristics or traits of the dataset that can
be measured in some way. For example, if one were to have a dataset of a network capture
that included characteristics such as packet length, destination port, source port, etc., then
each of those traits could be used as a feature. In most cases, not all of the features of a
9
dataset will be relevant for the learning involved, and therefore feature generation will be
conducted. This can include removing unnecessary features and transforming others. The
output of a ML algorithm is a model that can make predictions on new data.
2.1.1 Supervised
Supervised ML builds a model based on mapping an input to an output. All the data
that is used for training in supervised models are labeled, hence why it is referred to as
supervised. The two most commonly used techniques for supervised learning are statistical
classification and regression analysis. Statistical classification takes an input and then maps
it to a category as an output. An example of this would be taking input of various features
of a flower and then the model would output the type of flower. Because the output is
assigned a category and not a value, it is statistical classification. Regression analysis, on
the other hand, uses the input and provides a continuous value as an output. An example of
a regression algorithm would be to take input such as salary, job title, and the type of car a
person drives and then based on that, provide an output that attempts to predict the age of
a person. In the regression model, there are no specific categories and in this case, it is a
numerical sliding scale.
2.1.2 Semi-supervised
Semi-supervised ML uses a combination of labeled and unlabeled data within its training
dataset. A popular algorithm within semi-supervised ML is self-learning. This algorithm
uses the data that has already been labeled by a human to try and label the rest of the
unlabeled data. It will go through many iterations of this due to the fact that it will only
label the unlabeled data when it has a high confidence of the correct prediction. This type
of ML model can be useful for when there is so much data that it is either unfeasible or
inefficient for a human to go through and label everything within the dataset. A human
would then go in and label a percentage of the data and allow the algorithm to do the rest
of the work. An example of this would be if a ML application was trying to detect fraud.
Using supervised ML and labeling all of the fraud in the dataset might not be feasible since
there may be unknown examples of fraud in the dataset. In this case, we would label the
data we could and then have the ML algorithm attempt to label the rest of the data.
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2.1.3 Unsupervised
UnsupervisedML is different from the previous two categories due to the fact that it contains
no labeled data. All data within the training dataset is unlabeled. Because there is no labeled
data, unsupervised ML models primarily use one of two methods to analyze the data. The
first method is called clustering and algorithms that use this method will group data together
by commonalities. Algorithms that use cluster analysis are ideal for situations where the
output desired is either data that is of the same kind, or when searching for anomalies.
Anomaly detection is a special case of clustering where there are two clusters: normal and
anomalous. Another method that may be used is visualization and dimensionality reduction,
which consists of using the model to visually represent the data as either two-dimensional
or three-dimensional. In this format, a human can discern patterns within the data, as
well as potentially see gaps within the patterns or outliers, such as anomalies. Generative
models, ML models that output how likely something is to occur, could also be considered
unsupervised. Unsupervised ML tends to be the most applicable to real-world applications
because most data is not labeled. For instance, many eCommerce and advertisement ML
applications use unsupervised learning.
2.2 Anomalous Network Traffic
In order to understand anomalous network traffic, one must first understand what constitutes
normal network traffic. It is also worth noting that just because traffic is anomalous, it does
not necessarily mean it is malicious. Network traffic consists of data that flows across
defined architectural layers between networks. Used for the purposes of this thesis is the
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. The OSI model was proposed in 1977 and was
presented as a discussion on a model that allowed all computers to communicate with one
another with a common architecture [7]. Figure 2.3 depicts the layers of the OSI model.
11
Figure 2.3. OSI Model. Source: [8].
A network is comprised of two or more computer systems that interact with one another
and can communicate back and forth. It can be connected via a physical medium, such as
Ethernet, or wirelessly, which is the case with the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 protocol, commonly referred to asWiFi [9]. Devices on a network
are constantly communicating through the use of protocols. There are many common
protocols, to include Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), User DatagramProtocol (UDP),
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), and Internet Protocol (IP) to name a few.
Protocols tend to be for a specific purpose. For example, ICMP is used for email, TCP
is used to establish and maintain a network communication, and UDP is also used for
communication but does not establish a connection or make sure that the hosts receive all
12
of the packets sent like TCP does. One of the most common protocols, UDP, is leveraged
in this research.
The OSI Model layer 3 contains the network data in the form of packets. These packets can
further be broken down into headers. Headers contain protocol specific information that
can be extracted into features that can be processed by a ML algorithm. The initial features
that were extracted from the IP and UDP header consisted of the source and destination
IP addresses, source and destination ports, and UDP packet length. UDP packet length
includes the combined length of data and the UDP header. This is sometimes referred to as
a 5-tuple and the components of the tuple can be seen in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4. IP and UDP Header. Adapted from [10].
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Different networks have different norms, therefore anomaly detection tends to be network-
specific. For instance, a guided-missile destroyer (DDG) unclassified network would see
different traffic than a shore basedNavy unclassified network, like at NPS. The two networks
would have different purposes and therefore much of the data seen transiting would vary in
volume and shape. For example, the circadian rhythm of a ship at sea would be essentially
a 24/7 flow of data, whereas the NPS unclassified network’s circadian rhythm would tend to
follow a traditional work week cycle, to include peak hours during 9-5 and lulls overnight
and on weekends. Another difference between the two aforementioned networks could be
the types of devices that are sending data across. For example, a ship would have systems
that help to identify friendly units and generate a common operating picture for situational
awareness that a shore-based network like NPS does not have. The following are some
examples of abnormal traffic that could be seen across a variety of different networks.
2.2.1 Misuse of a Protocol
One type of anomaly that may exist is when a specific protocol is used outside of its intended
purpose. An example of this is the use of the DNS protocol. The DNS protocol is used
to translate addresses from something human-readable to the underlying IP address that
belongs to the website or server a person is trying to reach. How the protocol works in the
simplest terms is the user will send a DNS query and the assigned DNS server will return
a response. How a malicious user could misuse this protocol is to create a covert channel
using any number of techniques. A covert channel is a communication channel that occurs
in a way that is not transparent to the network owner. An example of a very rudimentary
way of conducting DNS covert channel communications would be for the malicious user
to have their own DNS server that they would query. Then, from the network they are on,
they would have an odd number of queries equal a binary zero and an even number equal
to a binary one. Once received, the ones and zeroes would be put together into strings of
binary for whatever purpose chosen by the malicious user [11]. This is something that is
not immediately noticeable to a network administrator due to the fact that DNS queries and
responses are completely legitimate traffic. The anomaly in this situation would be that
there would be an extremely high number of queries and responses between the malicious
user and their DNS server.
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2.2.2 Excessive Latency
Another anomaly that often presents itself is excessive latency. Latency is a norm in
networks, as there is always some sort of time delay inherent in network communications.
When it becomes an anomaly is when the delay is greater than what is considered by the
network administrators as normal. This is one anomaly that is not necessarily malicious
and could be tied to something as simple as hardware or routing issues within a network.
However, it could also be indicative of something as malicious as a man-in-the-middle
attack. In a man-in-the-middle attack, a user’s network traffic is routed through a malicious
user unbeknownst to the original user. It is also possible in these cases for the malicious
user to alter the traffic that is being communicated through them.
2.2.3 High Volume of Traffic
While a high volume of traffic from a specific source or to a specific destination address is
not necessarily malicious, depending on the volume it could indicate an issue. Misconfig-
urations and hardware or software errors could cause a heavy volume of traffic. Malicious
traffic, most commonly in the form of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, could also cause
this type of anomaly. A DoS attack is an attack on a network that is meant to overwhelm a
node’s resources and result in a degraded or down node. This is done either through such a
large volume of data that it overwhelms some component of the network or in some cases,
a malformed packet that could crash a component of the network.
2.3 Previous Research
To date, there has been a significant amount of research done in the area of anomaly
detection using ML. Most of the research has largely revolved around the use of supervised
or semi-supervisedML, however, there has also been research conducted with unsupervised
ML. This area of research is relatively new, with the majority of the research occurring
within the last decade. The accuracy of the different techniques varies as does their ability
to detect false positives and false negatives. A true positive and true negative are when the
predicted values match the actual values. In the case of anomaly detection, this would mean
that when the ML model detects an anomaly, it is actually an anomaly. A false positive and
false negative are when the predicted values do not line up with the actual values. A false
positive would be if the model flagged something as anomalous when in actuality it was not
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an anomaly. A false negative would be if something was an anomaly and the ML model did
not identify it as such. Figure 2.5 shows a true/false and positive/negative confusion matrix.
Figure 2.5. Confusion Matrix. Source: [12].
2.3.1 Supervised Machine Learning Application
In 2018, at an Intelligent Systems Conference, a joint research paper was produced by
students from Princess Sumaya University for Technology and Mutah University. In this
paper, the students laid out how they used three different supervised ML techniques for the
purpose of detecting DoS attacks. They built ML models using Random Forest, Ada Boost,
and multilayer perceptron classifiers. These classifiers were used to take in Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) data that included information from the network routers,
switches, and hubs. The result of their research was that the Random Forest classifier
performed the best and was able to detect anomalies with a 99.93 percent accuracy and the
other two classifiers were not far behind. Ada Boost MI detected anomalies with 99.60
percent accuracy and MLP with 98.86 percent accuracy [13].
2.3.2 Unsupervised Machine Learning Application
In 2007, at the 2nd USENIX workshop on tackling computer systems problems with ML
techniques, a research paper was published by three students from McGill University in
Montreal, Canada. This paper presented how unsupervised ML could be used to detect
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network anomalies, such as attacks on the network or high volumes of traffic. The students
used two different ML techniques: One-Class Neighbor Machine and Kernel-based Online
Anomaly Detection. The ML techniques were each applied to two different datasets. One
of the datasets was the Abilene network, which includes 11 core routers. The other dataset
was a set of still image captures from a traffic webcam in Quebec. Although not a network-
related dataset, this was used as evidence of the viability of using unsupervised ML for
anomaly detection. The results of this research were not quantified; however, the researchers
conclude that both unsupervised ML techniques applied were successful but needed tweaks
to be more efficient. Of the necessary changes identified for future work two of them that
stood out were the need for the algorithms to run in real-time and to adapt as the incoming
data changes [14]. The latter of the previous challenges is typically referred to as distribution
shift, which means that what we consider normal and anomalous behavior will change over
time.
2.3.3 Robust Random Cut Forest
In 2016 a paperwaswritten that delved into the use of theRobust RandomCut Forest (RRCF)
algorithm to detect anomalies, specifically anomalies within a data stream. A data stream
is a unique problem set for anomaly detection due to the fact that it is not limited to solely
a snapshot. In previous research that involved ML for anomaly detection, the research was
conducted against a static set of data. This sort of application works when there is a finite
amount of data, but for the real-world application of detecting anomalies within a network,
one would not want to be limited to just one portion of data. The preferred method would
be to input a stream of data and conduct anomaly detection as the data flows through the
architecture. The research team discovered that regardless of the sample size used RRCF
was more accurate at detecting anomalies (in some cases the accuracy over doubled) than
the baseline Isolation Forest algorithm. In addition to a significant increase in accuracy,
RRCF was also less likely to flag false positives [15].
A team from the University of Michigan wrote another research paper that further built on
the work of Guha et al. in 2019. This paper produced the first open-source implementation
of RRCF for other researchers to build on and experiment with. With their open-source
code Bartos et al. conducted two tests to validate the work previously conducted in the
2016 study. The first test confirmed that RRCF did, in fact, detect outliers that One-Class
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SVM and Isolation Forest algorithms were unable to. The second test was conducted to






The network data used for research was collected from the NPS Education and Research
Network (ERN), reviewed and approved by the NPS Institutional Review Board (IRB),
then released by the Information Technology and Communications Services (ITACS). In
order to test the effectiveness of the algorithm and ML model implemented, network traffic
was collected from two separate locations, as shown in Figure 3.1. The first location
was outside of the NPS firewall where traffic leaving the network was already filtered but
traffic coming in was not. The second location was inside the firewall where traffic was
filtered coming in but was not filtered leaving the network. After the network data was
collected, it was then cleaned up to include only features relevant for our research and
turned into a format that could be uploaded into an Amazon Web Services (AWS) Simple
Storage Service (S3) bucket for ingestion into Amazon SageMaker, the ML service, and
Application Programming Interface (API) used to train, test, and deploy the ML model. An
API is an interface between a program and a library, which adds additional functionality to
the program. The AWS infrastructure is shown in Figure 3.2. Once the data was uploaded
to AWS S3, additional features were generated.
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Figure 3.1. NPS ERN
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Figure 3.2. AWS Architecture. Source: [17].
3.2 Data Collection
Shown in Figure 3.1 is the flow of data as it traverses the NPS ERN from capture point to
AWS. The first capture point is at Outside Router and is outside of the firewall. The data
coming into the network at this capture point is not filtered by the ERN firewall but traffic
that is leaving the network is. The second capture point is at Inside Router, which provides
data that is unfiltered when leaving the network but incoming traffic that is filtered by the
ERN firewall. The data from both of these capture points is then sent through the Packet
Broker switch to the the Control Server. The Control Server then pushes the files through
a dedicated 10 Gb/s connection to Hamming, NPS’s supercomputer. The file format for
capture is PCAP, a common format for network traffic captures. Scripts located on the
Control Server automate this entire process. See Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix
C for associated code.
3.3 Preprocessing
The format that was ingested into the ML model is Comma-separated Values (CSV). CSV
files separate the different values by comma, offer a tabular format, and are commonly read
by programs and APIs, such as Scala, Apache Spark, and Python. Converting to CSV
linearly, one-by-one, is incredibly time consuming, and in order to convert pcap files to
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CSV in parallel, a large amount of processing power was necessary. It is for this reason that
Hamming was used for the conversion. During the conversion to CSV, the pcap files were
stripped of data irrelevant to the research. The conversion was automated by a script that
used TShark, a command-line interface that allows for the same network packet analysis as
Wireshark.
The data that was retained from the pcap files during conversion to CSV files was filtered
to only include the DNS protocol and consisted of the 5-tuple plus epoch time, making it a
6-tuple. This can be seen in Figure 3.3. Epoch time is a standardized time that all computers
worldwide use and is the total elapsed time in seconds from January 1, 1970 at 00:00:00
Universal Time Coordinated (UTC). Epoch time for this capture was the time the packet
was seen by the Control Server.
Figure 3.3. Head of CSV with 6-Tuple
Upon completion of preprocessing the CSV files were uploaded to an AWS S3 bucket for
additional feature generation prior to training a ML model, as shown in Figure 3.4. The
connection from the NPS ERN is highlighted in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.4. Additional Features Generated
3.4 Feature Selection
After the CSV files were uploaded to an AWS S3 bucket, the data was streamed into a
series of services and frameworks to generate features and prepare the data for ingestion
into the ML model. The following programming languages and frameworks were used to
accomplish this.
• Python — Python is a high-level programming language that is very human-readable
and due to this, easy to code with. However, it is very inefficient with its memory
usage and is unable to conduct parallel processing. Additionally, the basic scripts for
data transfer were written in Python and the Amazon SageMaker API can be accessed
through Python.
• Scala—"Scala combines object-oriented and functional programming in one concise,
high-level language. Scala’s static types help avoid bugs in complex applications,
and its Java Virtual Machine (JVM) and JavaScript runtimes let you build high-
performance systems with easy access to huge ecosystems of libraries" [18]. Scala
was used to generate features by combining columns over time periods to create
relationships within the data that added additional insight into the data that was
not originally there. Scala can handle large volumes of data and conduct parallel
processing very quickly due to its use of Spark as a framework.
• Spark — Spark is a "unified analytics engine for large-scale data processing. It
achieves high performance for both batch and streaming data, using a state-of-the-
art Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) scheduler, a query optimizer, and a physical
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execution engine." It can be used within a variety of other programming languages,
such as Python, Scala, and Java, and is ideal due to its ability to efficiently handle
large volumes of data. It can also be run on existing frameworks, in the cloud, or by
itself as a standalone [19].
• HadoopMapReduce— "HadoopMapReduce is a software framework for distributed
processing of large datasets on compute clusters of commodity hardware. It is a
sub-project of the Apache Hadoop project. The file system, Hadoop Distributed File
System (HDFS), is a distributed file system designed to run on commodity hardware,
is fault-tolerant, and provides high throughput that is beneficial for applications that
have a large data set [20]. The framework takes care of scheduling tasks, monitoring
them and re-executing any failed tasks" [21].
The first five features that were chosen were the 5-tuple. On their own, without viewing their
relationship with each other, each of these can be individually observed by theML algorithm
for anomalous behavior, however not very effectively. They were all chosen because they
relate to DNS traffic and are necessary to detect inter-relational anomalies within the dataset.
The following are the 5 basic features that were looked at and what anomalous behavior of
those features might represent when inter-related with other features. The 5-tuple features
were looked at as they related to Epoch time, and the inclusion of Epoch time makes it a
6-tuple.
• Source IP Address — The source IP address is the IP address of the initial sender of a
packet. An anomaly that could be detected with this is a high volume of DNS packets
from a unique source IP address over a time window.
• Destination IP Address — The destination IP address is the IP address of the initial
sender of a packet. Using the destination IP address, the same type of anomalies
as with using the source IP address can be detected. This is useful when looking at
traffic that is inbound to the network.
• Source Port — The source port is the port number that a packet originated from.
If the sender is a client then the port number will most often be greater than 1023,
whereas if it is a server, it will be a common port number. Common port numbers are
generally tied to a specific protocol, for example, port 53 is typically DNS traffic. If
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traffic is identified that is DNS and it is not over port 53, and is also not greater than
1023, this could potentially be anomalous.
• Destination Port — The destination port is the port number that a packet is being sent
to. If the packet originated from a client then the destination port will most often be
a common port number, whereas a server’s destination port will be a port number
greater than 1023. Anomalous behavior in this situation would be similar to that of a
source port.
• UDP Packet Length — The UDP packet length is the total length of a package in
bytes. For DNS traffic, the length may vary but it would be anomalous if the average
packet size was 256 bytes for instance and a packet came through that was 512 bytes.
The features just discussed were simple in terms of their relationships. However, more
complex features can be generated by writing code that develops relationships between two
or more CSV columns and includes this in a separate column in a newCSV. One of the most
important relationships is that of the features as seen over a sliding time window. The length
of the time window will add or remove granularity. If the time window is too narrowly
scoped then it could miss anomalies that take place over a large time window and conversely
if the time window is too broadly scoped it may miss anomalies that appear normal due to
repetitive occurrences over a larger time window. These features can be further grouped
into the categories of descriptive, histogram, and contextual. The following features were
used in this thesis:
3.4.1 Descriptive Features
Descriptive based features take in multiple values and use statistical methods to compress
them down to a single scalar value. Descriptive based features that were used were:
• DNS Traffic Volume — This feature created a relationship between source and desti-
nation IP address and number of packets over a rolling time window. Any source IP
addresses that were identified as an NPSDNS server were dropped from the dataset as
the feature was created. This feature identified unique source IP addresses that were
sending or receiving high volumes of DNS traffic to a unique destination IP address.
Traffic originating from NPS DNS servers were dropped from the dataset because it
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is a known that the majority of the packets should be to or from the school’s DNS
servers.
• Packet Length Distribution — This feature created a relationship between source or
destination IP address and UDP packet length. Unique IP addresses were looked at
over a window of time and their total UDP packet lengths were averaged and then
compared against all the other unique IP addresses. Potentially anomalous behavior
that was identified were the outliers that fell outside of the overall average packet
length. NPS DNS servers were also dropped from this dataset.
3.4.2 Histogram Features
A histogram is a visual representation via bars on a graph of the distribution of items over
an axis. This axis could be time, a count of something, or another unique identifier. The
bars that are depicted by the histogram are a representation of a range of values, referred to
as bins. The use of bins allows results to be grouped together and a cleaner visualization
of the resulting outputs [22]. Histogram features can be either normalized or contain
frequency counts. The histograms in this thesis use frequency counts, meaning that counts
are provided for each bin, and are not normalized to scale values relative to one another.
The following is the histogram-based feature that was used:
• Frequency Distribution of Packet Sizes — This feature takes unique source IPs and
calculates the frequency of packet size ranges over a time window. Anomalous
behavior that would be beneficial to identify is source IP addresses that is sending
a large number of overly large packets over the time window. The packet size
ranges are predefined and referred to as bins. Bin sizes were determined through an
implementation of the Freedman–Diaconis rule, which uses the Interquartile Range,
to group ranges into bins. The Interquartile Range takes a range of values, divides it
into four equal parts, where each of the dividing lines is a quartile, and the output is
the third quartile value minus the first quartile value [23].
3.5 Machine Learning Algorithm
The Amazon SageMaker implementation of RRCF was chosen because it has several
beneficial characteristics that make it the best fit for this problem set. As described in
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Chapter 2, among other things RRCF excels at anomaly detection in streaming data. It is
also resilient to irrelevant data, so if one of the features that is provided does not produce
value, the algorithm will inherently devalue its presence. The algorithm provides what is
known as scoring, which is an essential element to determining if a data point is considered
anomalous or not. The scoring varies by application and is not necessarily just a percentage.
The lower the score, the less likely that a data point is an anomaly, and conversely the higher
the score, the more likely it is that a data point is an anomaly [24]. The cutoff for what is
considered anomalous can be set by the user and should be set to produce the fewest number
of false negatives possible.
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The purpose of delving into the code is to describe how the features enumerated in the
previous chapter were created and utilized to translate large quantities of information into
a small amount of useful information for the network operator. This information flow is
illustrated in Figure 4.1. Source code documents are divided by programming language and
functionality and may be found in the appendices. NPS specific information was scrubbed
from the code, including items such as network bits in IP addresses, DNS server information,
and AWS S3 bucket information. All scrubbed information is annotated in the code with
comments.
Figure 4.1. Data Flow Topology
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4.2 Data Capture
The capture and temporary storage of the dataset as it traversed from the Control Server to S3
was carefully considered and coded for efficiency due to the terabytes of data collected and
the computationally heavy operations that were required to take place at each step. Python
was chosen as the language to control this process as it has a simple to maintain syntax
and can easily access operating system commands while still being relatively portable.
Due to the nature of the captured dataset and the network it was recorded from, data-
scrubbing requirements from NPS ITACS were complied with, including the obfuscation
of IP address network bits. Some basic filtering was conducted in this step to include the
removal of all traffic that was not IPv4. The scripts were run from the Control Server
and included functionality to transfer the captured data to Hamming for obfuscation of the
network bits, conversion to CSV files, and transfer to the Storage Area Network (SAN) for
temporary storage before uploading to S3. The code used on Hamming to convert to CSV is
proprietary to the implementation of Hamming and not included in an Appendix, however,
for reproducibility, it was simply a wrapper for theWireshark command line utility, TShark,
which natively supports conversion to CSV [25].
4.3 Feature Generation
The features that were generated for this pipeline were fundamentally chosen as a proof of
concept and were not intended to demonstrate anything beyond the ability of the software
to process large volumes of data. Feature generation started in the ‘Hamming’ block, seen
in Figure 4.1, where the dataset was reduced from all network traffic, terabytes of data, to
just DNS traffic, gigabytes of data. Reduction continued in AWS with application of the
Scala programming language in the SparkFeaturePipeline file, found in Appendix E. The
dataset size required substantial processing power, leveraged in the form of Apache Spark
with a Hadoop powered Elastic MapReduce (EMR) Cluster, to distribute and accelerate
the computational load. This processing power was leveraged to remove all rows of the
dataset that did not consist of a source IP address from within NPS private IP space with
a destination port of 53. AWS EMR Clusters are well suited for this task because they
interface well with AWS S3 and SageMaker and, most importantly, can be configured with
rules that automatically increase and decrease computational capacity as the load fluctuates,
keeping computational costs to a minimum.
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The ML model was trained on a subset of the features that were generated. Summary
statistics were indexed to individual Source IP addresses, and were computed over the
whole dataset to include the same Packet Length Sum, Packet Count, and Average Packet
Length as the features that were used in training the ML model. This consolidated the data
to a point where processing it with ML would not have provided as accurate of results as
possible. This is in part due to the trade-off that comes with time window variance. A
smaller time window provides finer granularity but features have a higher variance and vice
versa for a larger time window. To prevent this over-consolidation of information, the data
was split and processed concurrently in different code branches. A time window based from
the recorded Epoch Time feature in the dataset was added to one code branch as shown in
Figure 4.2, which had the effect of breaking summary statistics into sections that equal the
time window’s length. The length of the time window is an easily configurable variable in
the source code found in Appendix E and was set to ten minutes for this research. After
feature generation, the dataset saw a reduction in size to less than 100 megabytes.
Figure 4.2. Machine Learning Feature Generation
4.4 Machine Learning
The implementation of RRCF on SageMaker is relatively concise as it depends on objects
and API calls as demonstrated in the model creation and training code in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3. Machine Learning Code
4.5 Inference
After the model is trained, a subset of the data needs to be given anomaly scores, as
explained in Section 2.3.3. This process involves taking the validation data, about twenty
percent of the total data, and feeding it into the ML model. Twenty percent was chosen
because of the quality of visualizations it produces, which would prove the most beneficial
to a watchstander. While different ML algorithms will return different results, RRCF will
produce and return a simple numerical score per row of the dataset. In this case, each IP
Source address received a score for every Time Window it existed in.
When choosing Inference methodologies, two options are readily available within Amazon
SageMaker: deploying an endpoint or utilizing Batch Transform jobs. Batch Transform
jobs were chosen for their nonpersistent nature and ease of use over more static datasets.
Batch Transform also has the built in ability to automatically add the results to the dataset
and store it in an S3 bucket. This is seen in Figure 4.4. SageMaker Endpoints may be a
better option to explore in future work, which is covered more in depth in Chapter 7.
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Figure 4.4. Batch Transform Code
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As described in Section 3.1, the data used for this thesis was not generated but rather
collected from a live network on which there was no control over the transmitted content.
There was no assumption of preexisting anomalies and no manufactured data that would
intentionally stand out as anomalous was injected. As seen in Figure 5.1, the packet sizes
show a left distribution normally seen in DNS traffic, which is representative of a standard
Navy network.
Figure 5.1. Normal Network Traffic
The dataset, for being only about three calendar days in length, was large and diverse. It
originally consisted of 1.8TB of PCAP header data, or about 621GB per day. After the
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initial conversions and dataset reductions, there was about 6GB per day of DNS packet data
in CSV form. Through feature generation, cleaning, and processing discussed in Section
4.3, the remainder was about 9000 unique IP source addresses and the remaining valuable
information for about 85 million packets. This information was stored in a variety of
different CSV files that were less than 100MB in combined size. The data did not adhere
well to the expectation that DNS traffic varies with the normal circadian rhythm of humanity,
but had a somewhat consistent average packet size and volume, as shown in Figure 5.2.
This might be a factor of dataset length and given enough time to investigate and reduce the
outliers through reduction of found network anomalies over time, a circadian rhythm might
become more apparent.
Figure 5.2. Graph of Network Activity over Time
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5.2 Data Analysis and Visualization
The final dataset for statistics, visualization, and machine learning consisted entirely of data
representing hosts internal to the NPS ERN. As described in Section 4.3, all extraneous
informationwas removed to enable the best employment of the designed features for anomaly
detection on this subset of network devices.
Of the three computed features that were presented to RRCF, only the Packet Length Sum
feature produced usable results. The Packet Count and Average Packet Length features did
not provide a clear separation between anomalous and benign traffic and were discarded.
These unused features did not appear to affect the results since RRCF is able to filter
extraneous data, as previously discussed.
Figure 5.3, demonstrates the linear nature of how the anomaly scoring occurs over the
Packet Length Sum feature. It shows how as the feature increases in value so does the
anomaly score, as each point on the graph is indexed by both IP Address and TimeWindow.
From this graph one can see that the anomaly score increasing with packet length sum is
consistent with the intuition that many large DNS queries in a short time span should be
flagged as anomalous.
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Figure 5.3. Graphical Representation of the Linear Relationship between the
Score and Feature
When the Packet Length Sum feature is graphed over the Time Window, and each point is
colored by the anomaly score, the linear results remain as the highest scoring anomalies are
clustered at the top of the graph, as seen in Figure 5.4. This begins to break the clumps
of anomalous data out into individual data points. This is useful but still too dense for a
human watchstander to make use of as it is difficult to determine which IP Source addresses
are producing the anomalous results.
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Figure 5.4. Graphical Representation of Feature over Time
Figure 5.5 breaks out IP source address onto its own axis to graphically represent the same
data in a way that provides the watchstander a clearer idea of which IP addresses to focus
on due to anomalous data originating from those IP sources. The rows seen are anomalous
scores showing that the origination point is continuing to produce anomalous activity in each
Time Window. As further explained in Section 7.2.6, how to implement this visualisation
into a near-real time data feed could be a useful area for future research.
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Figure 5.5. Graphical Representation of Time and IP Source by Anomaly
An efficient way to summarize the data for awatchstander or network operator is to give them
an easily readable list of IP addresses that have been flagged by the system as anomalous.
Figure 5.6 offers this option more clearly than the above image by taking the IP source
addresses per time window, aggregating, then normalizing the anomaly scores, and finally
displaying the results by IP source address. This graph would be exceptionally useful if
updated based on near-real time input as it would show which hosts trend above average.
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Figure 5.6. Histogram of Anomalous IP Addresses
5.3 Results Discussion
The top two IP addresses were isolated and found to have sent an excessive number of multi-
cast DNS packets over the dataset. NPS ITACS considered these findings to be significant
enough that an incident ticket was created to investigate the addresses. It is important to
note that because of where the packets were captured on the network, the existing network
security tools did not detect the same metrics, but were able to prove that six of the top IP
addresses were part of the same functional group of computers. The dataset as recorded
and analyzed does not provide the level of granularity to directly allow additional insight
into the specific nature of the anomaly, but these results provide a starting point for deeper
investigation into anomalous hosts.
This concentration of results shows that as opposed to many anomalous windows across
a variety of unrelated IPs, the fact that they are concentrated to only a few related hosts
suggests confidence in those hosts actually being anomalous. In other words, RRCF only
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trained on individual time winds windows and as such has no sense of how one time window
relates to another, but the fact that it consistently picks out the same hosts as anomalous is
a strong indication that those hosts are actually behaving out of the norm.
To narrow down the results, the previous graphs in this chapter were created using an
anomaly score cutoff of five standard deviations produced by theMLmodel on the validation
dataset which supports an assumption of a normal data distribution. The anomaly score
cutoff was determined in this thesis on the basis of data distribution, presentation, and
visualization. Testing was conducted for three through ten standard deviations and the
results are shown in the following Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7. Standard Deviation Testing Results
As outlined in the confusion matrix in Section 2.3, if the threshold is set too high the
incidence of false negatives would increase and false positives would decrease. This may
lead to true anomalous activity being missed by the watchstander. If the threshold is set too
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low, the watchstander might become overwhelmed with false positives, leading to normal
activity being investigated unnecessarily. If implemented in an architecture like INOSS, the
implementation would have to take into account the cost of potentially setting the anomaly
score threshold too high or too low. Of note, for some visualizations, setting a higher
standard deviation might make a visualization more readable, and for other visualizations,
a lower standard deviation will display the information with greater clarity.
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CHAPTER 6:
Implementation within INOSS Framework
6.1 Overview
As part of the initial requirements levied by FCC/C10F, the scope of this thesis is not only
to show if ML is effective at detecting anomalies but also to provide a possible method of
implementation of the research within existing Navy architecture. The rest of this chapter
highlights existing Navy architecture, the architecture used for this research, and how the
two could be merged to fit the Navy’s needs.
6.2 INOSS
In 2019, a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) was developed by personnel at FCC/C10F
that addressed the disjointed and inconsistent nature of how the Navy manages, uses, and
protects the DODIN-N, the Navy’s portion of the Department of Defense Information
Network (DODIN), for Command & Control (C2) and Situational Awareness (SA). The
CONOPS sought to mitigate the often slow and generally dysfunctional flow of information
from the edge of the networks to the watchstander on a watchfloor. The operating model
that came out of this broad discussion about how to conduct business more efficiently is
the INOSS Framework shown in Figure 6.1. This is the method by which FCC/C10F will
"operate, maintain, secure, protect, defend, and maneuver the DODIN-N" [26]. The INOSS
Framework provides a standardized structure for all of the Navy’s existing cyber tools and
capabilities to fit within. Once under the umbrella of INOSS, any overlap of similar tools
or capabilities can be merged and any gaps can be quickly identified and addressed.
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Figure 6.1. INOSS Framework. Source: [26].
Using ML to detect network anomalies fits within the framework under Decision Analytics.
DecisionAnalytics ismaking decisions using data science principles on data that is collected
throughout the DODIN-N. The use of data science to analyze and make decisions increases
the efficiency and effectiveness with which responses and actions can be taken on the
network. Decision Analytics will directly drive visualization and help determine what the
watchstanders will see. In the case of anomaly detection, a visual representation of the
anomaly detected will be pushed to the watchfloor for SA. As seen in Figure 6.2, ML will
be applied in conjunction with data modeling, predictive analytics, and data aggregation
and synchronization.
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Figure 6.2. Decision Analytics. Source: [27].
6.3 AWS
AWS is a comprehensive suite of tools hosted on servers owned by Amazon, that are
accessible globally. A variety of different services are available but the one used to build
and train the ML model was Amazon SageMaker. In order for Amazon SageMaker to be
accessed, a connection with AWS must first be established. The user is then free to access
Amazon SageMaker, as well as any of the other services currently offered byAmazon. What
this means for the end user is that they do not have to spend the money on infrastructure,
maintenance, security, upkeep, and upgrades (e.g., memory, storage, etc.) that would
typically be cost prohibitive for a large company, let alone a single end user.
6.3.1 Amazon SageMaker
Amazon SageMaker is a ML service and API offered by Amazon that enables a user to
build, train, test, deploy, and evaluate aMLmodel. Another benefit is the ability for multiple
people to access the notebooks with code, allowing for collaborative efforts. Additionally,
the code from Amazon SageMaker notebooks can be transferred for local use, allowing a
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company to make use of their own infrastructure to train, test, and deploy a ML model [28].
SageMaker was the primary choice to conduct ML for this research due to the fact that
it is already integrated into an infrastructure that can handle large amounts of data, is
automatically scalable, and has built in ML algorithms, omitting the need to create custom
algorithms. The AWS costs for the research on a static dataset were negligible and a realistic
cost analysis of large scale operation remains an item for future work.
6.4 Amazon SageMaker within INOSS
Perhaps the most cost effective and quickest option for implementing ML within the INOSS
framework is to use AWS. This approach would be more efficient and effective from the
perspective of time required to develop and maintain an architecture since AWS is already
a robust managed infrastructure that is easily able to automatically adapt to accommodate
large volumes of data. AWS maintains and updates their servers regularly which means
the Navy will always have access to the latest hardware and software versions, to include
all security patches. The Navy is organized such that the vast majority of the Navy’s fleet
data flows through fleet NOCs and therefore these are the ideal locations to deploy the ML
models. The downside, as aforementioned, is that AWS requires connectivity to use. The
fleet NOCs would have to be able to sustain a connection to the AWS servers in order to
train new models. This could prove challenging, especially in a denied environment that
could arise during a conflict with an adversarial nation.
The second option for adopting ML within the Navy’s existing INOSS framework would be
to train and deploy models using Amazon SageMaker, or a similar ML API, and then run
those models locally. The primary hurdle to overcome with a custom built infrastructure
would be ensuring that the storage and processing capacity was high enough to account for
the sheer volume of data that would flow through the servers. Not only would there be a
high volume of data, the processing power would need to account for deploying the model
over streaming data in a real-time environment. In addition, if the Navy were to contract
out the development, installation, maintenance, and upgrade cycle of the infrastructure, it
would potentially be outdated by the time it was installed.
The final option would be to build and produce everything local from beginning to end.
This would include acquiring a Navy owned API, creating models with this API locally,
48
and then deploying locally as well. The same obstacles as mentioned in option two would
apply to this, with the additional difficulty of contracting and obtaining a Navy specific API.
Figure 6.3 shows a comparison of the first and last options.
Figure 6.3. Infrastructure Comparison
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CHAPTER 7:
Conclusion and Future Research
7.1 Overview
The results fromChapter 5 ultimately showed thatML can in fact be used to detect anomalies
within a Navy dataset. The caveat to this is that the proof-of-concept is only valid at this
point as it relates to DNS traffic. The rest of this chapter outlines some of the issues faced
as we collected data, created a pipeline, and ran ML on the dataset. It also provides areas
for future work, key takeaways from the research, and ends with a conclusion.
7.2 Thesis Limitations and Future Research
The course of this thesis changed dramatically over its existence. The data source, data
collection, coding, dataset, and data processing platforms all underwent various changes
throughout the development process. Throughout this process much was learned, especially
when it comes to identifying areas that still need to be explored.
7.2.1 Data Source
Originally we sought to collect data from an afloat Navy platform. This would have been the
best application of this applied research proof-of-concept because the shipboard networks
are highly controlled. Unlike the NPS network, they do not allow the users to bring their
own devices and as such would have allowed for easier data analysis. The shipboard dataset
would have been significantly smaller, for even though NPS utilizes only ten percent of its
available bandwidth, that still is greater than themaximum capacity of the average shipboard
connection by a factor of a thousand. The thesis team was unable to gain authorized access




Because we collected on a larger network, the need to capture all the data, as opposed to
just a sample, for this applied research project pushed existing hardware beyond its normal
limits, which caused significant problems. For example, the data collection hardware was
initially insufficient, making data loss a recurring issue and infrastructure had to be modified
or completely reworked on both the hardware and software levels several times to support
the volume of data. Different functions of the logical and physical data pipeline, referenced
in Figure 4.1, shifted between devices and locations as necessary to reduce this data loss
and increase processing speed as much as possible. These efforts significantly delayed any
substantial data capture efforts.
Future research in anything regarding the use of IP data can leverage the data collection
architecture that we developed in conjunction with ITACS on the NPS campus. The data
pipeline that was developed is robust, capable of scaling up to support significant volumes
of sustained network traffic, and has potential to serve a plethora of research projects.
7.2.3 Code
The selection of programming languageswas a process of trial and error. The final selections
of Scala for feature generation and Python for ML and visualization as described in Section
3.4 were chosen in response to difficulties working with other languages. For feature
generation, the difficulties were primarily based on the size of the data and the speed at
which processing needed to occur. We did not find a language that had the same feature
set as Scala which also incorporated a Spark interface to the compute clusters. The native
support of Scala on AWS and its connection to the HDFS that runs on EMR clusters, was
key in our goal of creating a scalable solution. Python was the language of choice for ML
and visualization because of the API availability and support. The code in the appendices
may serve future researchers as a foundation for data collection, transformation, feature
generation, machine learning, inference, and visualization.
7.2.4 Dataset
Only a small fraction of the collected data was used through the whole data pipeline. Most
was removed early in the process, but could easily be retained for use in later steps. In this
thesis the research was conducted only on DNS traffic, but adding other protocols could
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show that ML can find anomalies other than ones that are DNS related. This would be
especially important if using shipboard data, as the afloat network would produce different
results than a shore network based on the differences in the shape of the data, which might
include variances in protocol distribution or different protocols entirely. When adding a
protocol, the research would then need to expand the feature generation to include this new
information as the feature pipeline that the thesis team created is only functional for DNS
traffic.
Another area for future research with regard to the dataset is using the injection of known
anomalies in order to better quantify the effectiveness of the ML model. If this were done
building on the use of just DNS traffic then the model could be trained on normal data and
then tested with known anomalies. To inject known anomalies, a tool such as Iodine could
be used to create a covert channel within the network and the resulting anomalies should
be detected when testing the ML model. This, if conducted under controlled conditions,
would create a dataset that could result in semi-supervised model evaluation.
7.2.5 Data Processing Platform
TheAWS platform is powerful, flexible, and has a somewhat user friendly interface allowing
the use of significant, if potentially costly, computing resources. A potential downside to
utilizing AWS is the rapid rate of change on the platform and as a result, documentation is
sometimes out of date. This was encountered by the thesis team somewhat often on AWS’s
relatively new SageMaker ML platform. It is important to note this research was conducted
on the AWS GovCloud, which is a older version of the publicly available AWS with a
different software package update schedule. The platform is flexible, powerful, and is able
to handle any size data set at scale, but with those benefits, it comes with a steep learning
curve that does not always have documentation to help the new user, thus configuration of
the connections between all the data pipeline segments took significant time and research.
The flexibility and available options of the AWS SageMaker ML platform cannot be under-
stated. Due to constraints, this thesis utilized the AWS SageMaker Batch Transform option
to infer on the dataset, but a better solution for a watchfloor environment is the implemen-
tation of a persistent endpoint that can automatically produce interference results on a near
real-time basis. This would allow for the automation of a major part of the data pipeline
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and create the ability to run the ML on streaming data which create many opportunities for
future research.
7.2.6 Visualization for the Watchstander
The other area that this research project begins to explore, but that future work is needed
in, is the visualization of how the watchstander is able to not only view the data, but also
interact with this visual representation. Allowing the watchstander to interact with the
visualization could provide them much needed meaning and value on different aspects of
the results. For example, there is currently no way to manipulate the time window within
the visualization when looking at anomalies by unique IP address. Creating a mechanism
to manipulate this could allow a watchstander to scroll back in time to quickly determine if
a unique IP address has multiple types of anomalies. To give the watchstander the easiest
and most functional interactive experience, future work could implement the above in a
near-real time data feed to increase responsiveness.
7.3 Key Takeaways
"Big data is like teenage sex: everyone talks about it, nobody really knows how to do it,
everyone thinks everyone else is doing it, so everyone claims they are doing it..." [29].
This quote illuminates the lack of resources available to accomplish research at the scale
attempted by this applied research project. While big data is often discussed, few do more
than talk. From the data collection pipeline, to data wrangling, and to running ML on the
resulting data, there were few references or resources on how to conduct this project on the
terabytes of data that are flowing through the NPS ERN on a daily basis. Solutions to big
data problems tend to be very problem specific however, so future research will likely have
its own hurdles to overcome.
Problem solving occurred at every level: creating infrastructure, enabling accurate packet
capture, ensuring acceptable compute times for every step of the data pathway. Despite
the obstacles faced, one potential takeaway from this thesis could be that ML is a viable
option for the Navy to support existing IDSs and IPSs. This research serves primarily as
a proof-of-concept, showing that a data pipeline can be built and that ML can be used to





2 #∗File Name: control .py
#∗Description : Used to control and schedule the scripts for
4 #capture , obfuscation , and transfer .
#∗ Language: Python
6 #∗Authors: CTNC Jackie Turner ( jackie . turner@nps.edu) ,
#Dr. Vinnie Monaco (vinnie.monaco@nps.edu), LT Michael Laws
8 #(michael . laws@nps.edu), LT Greg Bunder (greg .bunder@nps.edu)
#∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
10
#!/ usr /bin /python3
12 import os
from subprocess import Popen, PIPE
14
# Note: modify only these to control interfaces , pcap location , destination
16 # directory , and length of capture
INSIDE_INTERFACE = ’eth0’ # NPS specific values scrubbed
18 OUTSIDE_INTERFACE = ’eth0’ # NPS specific values scrubbed
PCAP_DIR = ’ /tmp/pcap/’
20 LOG_FILE = ’ /tmp/pcap/pcap.log’
TRANSFER_TO = ’/ folder / ’ # NPS specific values scrubbed
22 CAPTURE_START = ’midnight’
24 # all units are seconds
CAPTURE_DURATION = 60∗60∗24∗7 # 7 days
26 BUFFER_DURATION = 60∗60 # 1 hour
TRANSFER_INTERVAL = 60∗60∗8 # 8 hours
28 OBFUSCATE_INTERVAL = 60∗60∗24 # 24 hours
30 if __name__ == ’__main__’:
os .makedirs(PCAP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
32 f = open(LOG_FILE, ’a’)
34 # capture at midnight
Popen([
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36 ’ at ’ ,
CAPTURE_START,
38 ], stdout=f , stderr =f , stdin =PIPE).communicate(input=’python3 capture .py’ .encode() )
40 # transfer every t //60 minutes. at doesn’ t support seconds
# and allow a grace period of 2∗t //60 after capture ends
42 transfer_interval_min = TRANSFER_INTERVAL//60
capture_duration_min = CAPTURE_DURATION//60
44 for i in range( transfer_interval_min ,
capture_duration_min + 2∗ transfer_interval_min ,
46 transfer_interval_min ) :
Popen([
48 ’ at ’ ,
f ’{CAPTURE_START} + {i} minutes’,
50 ], stdout=f , stderr =f , stdin =PIPE).communicate(input=’python3 transfer .py’ .encode() )
52 # regularly submit jobs to obfuscate
obfuscate_interval_min = OBFUSCATE_INTERVAL//60
54 for i in range( obfuscate_interval_min ,
capture_duration_min + 2∗ obfuscate_interval_min ,
56 obfuscate_interval_min ) :
Popen([
58 ’ at ’ ,
f ’{CAPTURE_START} + {i} minutes’,
60 ], stdout=f , stderr =f , stdin =PIPE).communicate(
input=’ssh user@server "srun −n1 −t600 −lobfuscate −−mem=64gb /folder/obfuscate.py"’ .





2 #∗ File Name: capture .py
#∗ Description : This script is used to run an at job every 24
4 #hours that will start and end a capture on interfaces em1 and
#em2.
6 #∗ Language: Python
#∗ Authors: CTNC Jackie Turner ( jackie . turner@nps.edu) ,
8 #Dr. Vinnie Monaco (vinnie.monaco@nps.edu), LT Michael Laws
#(michael . laws@nps.edu), LT Greg Bunder (greg .bunder@nps.edu)
10 #∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
12 #!/ usr /bin /python3
import os
14 import time
from subprocess import Popen
16 from control import ∗
18 NOW = time.strftime("%Y.%m.%d")
20 # capture settings
SNAPLEN = ’70’
22 MEM_BUFFER = ’4096’
24 # locations of things
TSHARK = ’tshark’
26 INSIDE_DIR = f’{PCAP_DIR}/inside/{NOW}’
OUTSIDE_DIR = f’{PCAP_DIR}/outside/{NOW}’
28 INSIDE_PREFIX = f’{INSIDE_DIR}/inside’
OUTSIDE_PREFIX = f’{OUTSIDE_DIR}/outside’
30
if __name__ == ’__main__’:
32 os .makedirs(INSIDE_DIR, exist_ok=True)
os .makedirs(OUTSIDE_DIR, exist_ok=True)
34






40 ’−f’ , ’ ip ’ , # filter ipv4
’−s’ , SNAPLEN,
42 ’−B’, MEM_BUFFER,
’−b’, f ’ duration :{BUFFER_DURATION}’,
44 ’−a’, f ’ duration :{CAPTURE_DURATION}’,
’−F’, ’pcap’ ,
46 ’−w’, INSIDE_PREFIX,





52 ’−f’ , ’ ip ’ , # filter ipv4
’−s’ , SNAPLEN,
54 ’−B’, MEM_BUFFER,
’−b’, f ’ duration :{BUFFER_DURATION}’,
56 ’−a’, f ’ duration :{CAPTURE_DURATION}’,
’−F’, ’pcap’ ,
58 ’−w’, OUTSIDE_PREFIX,





2 #∗ File Name: transfer .py
#∗ Description : This script is used to move files to Hamming.
4 #∗ Language: Python
#∗ Authors: CTNC Jackie Turner ( jackie . turner@nps.edu) ,
6 #Dr. Vinnie Monaco (vinnie.monaco@nps.edu), LT Michael Laws
#(michael . laws@nps.edu), LT Greg Bunder (greg .bunder@nps.edu)
8 #∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
10 #!/ usr /bin /python3
from subprocess import call
12 from control import ∗
14 if __name__ == ’__main__’:
f = open(LOG_FILE, ’a’)
16
# first do an rsync
18 call ([
’ rsync’ ,
20 ’−h’, # human readable numbers
’−v’, # verbose
22 ’−r’ , # recurse into directories
’−t’ , # preserve modification times
24 ’−P’, # −−partial (keep partially transferred files ) + −−progress (show progress during
transfer )




], stdout=f , stderr =f)
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2 #∗ File Name: obfuscate .py
#∗ Description : This script is used to obfuscate the internal
4 #IP addresses .
#∗ Language: Python
6 #∗ Authors: CTNC Jackie Turner ( jackie . turner@nps.edu) ,
#Dr. Vinnie Monaco (vinnie.monaco@nps.edu), LT Michael Laws
8 #(michael . laws@nps.edu), LT Greg Bunder (greg .bunder@nps.edu)
#∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
10
#!/ usr /bin /python3
12 import glob
from subprocess import call
14
TCPREWRITE = ’ / folder / ’ # NPS specific values scrubbed
16 LOG_FILE = ’ / folder / ’ # NPS specific values scrubbed
SOURCE = ’ / folder / ’ # NPS specific values scrubbed
18 DESTINATION = ’ / folder / ’ # NPS specific values scrubbed
20 if __name__ == ’__main__’:
f = open(LOG_FILE, ’a’)
22
source_outside = os . path . join (SOURCE, ’outside’)
24 source_inside = os . path . join (SOURCE, ’inside’)
destination_outside = os . path . join (DESTINATION, ’outside’)
26 destination_inside = os . path . join (DESTINATION, ’inside’)
os .makedirs( destination_outside , exist_ok=True)
28 os .makedirs( destination_inside , exist_ok=True)
30 # outside files : move to destination
call ([
32 ’ rsync’ ,
’−h’, # human readable numbers
34 ’−v’, # verbose
’−r’ , # recurse into directories
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36 ’−t’ , # preserve modification times
’−P’, # −−partial (keep partially transferred files ) + −−progress (show progress during
transfer )




42 ], stdout=f , stderr =f)
44 # inside files : obfuscate and move if success
for infile in glob .glob(os . path . join (SOURCE, ’inside/∗/inside_∗’) ) :
46 day, fname = infile . split ( ’ / ’ ) [−2:]
outdir = os . path . join ( destination_inside , day)
48 os .makedirs( outdir , exist_ok=True)
outfile = os . path . join ( outdir , fname)
50
exitval = call ([
52 TCPREWRITE,
’−−pnat=x.x.x.x/x:x.x.x.x/x,x.x.x.x/x:x.x.x.x/x’ # NPS specific values scrubbed
54 ’−− infile=’ infile ,
’−−outfile=’ outfile ,
56 ’−−fixcsum’,
], stdout=f , stderr =f)
58
if exitval == 0:
60 os .rm( infile )
else :
62 print ( ’Error obfuscating : ’ , infile , file =f)
62
APPENDIX E:
Spark Feature Pipeline Code
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
2 ∗ File Name: SparkFeaturePipeline
∗ Description : Ingest , transform , and export CSVs as formatted
4 by the pipeline .
∗ Language: Scala
6 ∗ Author: LT Michael Laws (michael . laws@nps.edu)
∗ Contributor : LT Greg Bunder (greg.bunder@nps.edu)




12 // Adds necessary Apache Spark and Scala Libraries
import org .apache. spark ._
14 import org .apache. spark . sql .SparkSession
import org .apache. spark . sql .DataFrame
16 import org .apache. spark . sql . types ._
import org .apache. spark . sql . expressions ._
18 import org .apache. spark . sql . expressions .UserDefinedFunction
import org .apache. spark . sql . expressions .Window
20 import org .apache. spark . sql . functions ._
import org .apache. spark . sql . functions .udf
22 import scala .math. floor
import java . net . InetAddress
24 import org .apache.hadoop.conf._
26 // Parameter Definitions
// Configurable parameters to allow for ease of changing program functionality
28
val window_size = 600 // Set the window size, integer in seconds. 600 seconds = 10 minutes
30 val time_window = "time_window"
32 // Information to remove DNS Server IP address information from Data
// servers to remove in IP address form, ie , "1.21" would be an acceptable host bit string to
denote a IP source in the following sequence
34 // string read from the right of the IP address
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val serverIPSeq= Seq("1.121" ) // NPS specific values scrubbed
36
// base network value for internal traffic .
38 // strings contain characters read from the left , ie "192."
val internalTraffic = Seq("192.") // NPS specific values scrubbed
40
// Set up options to pull files from S3.
42 // load whole data set
val dataSet = "s3 :// bucket / prefix /.∗/∗. csv" // NPS specific values scrubbed
44
/∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗




50 val packetFeaturesPath = "s3 :// bucket / prefix " // NPS specific values scrubbed
52 // Visualization files :
val summaryStatsPath = "s3 :// bucket / prefix " // NPS specific values scrubbed
54 val packetHistPath = "s3 :// bucket / prefix " // NPS specific values scrubbed
val TimeWindowSummaryStatsPath = "s3://bucket/prefix" // NPS specific values scrubbed
56
58 // Dataset Column Definitions
// Each column is defined as a data type and set as an immutable value
60 // Set up Structs for each column in the dataset
val frame_time_epoch = StructField ("frame_time_epoch", DoubleType, true )
62 val ip_src = StructField (" ip_src " , StringType , true )
val ip_dst = StructField (" ip_dst " , StringType , true )
64 val udp_len = StructField ("udp_len", IntegerType , true )
val udp_srcport = StructField ("udp_srcport" , IntegerType , true )
66 val udp_dstport = StructField ("udp_dstport" , IntegerType , true )
68 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// Functions and User Defined Functions
70 // All required compute functionality to support feature generation
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
72
// Declare the schema of the columns in the dataset as a struct type




78 // Use the SCHEMA val in a simple function to load the dataset into a dataframe .
def read(path : String ) : DataFrame = {




// time window compute function
84 def computeWindow(time: Float, window_size: Integer ) : Integer = {
time. toInt / window_size
86 }
88 // time window UDF
val computeWindowUDF = udf{(time: Float) => computeWindow(time, window_size)}
90
// basic conversion functions
92 def bool2int (b:Boolean) = if (b) 1 else 0
val toInt = udf[ Int , Double]( _. toInt )
94 val toDouble = udf[Double, Int ]( _.toDouble)
96 // User defined function to compute the size of the buckets based on the Freedman−Diaconis rule
// http :// bayes .wustl .edu/Manual/FreedmanDiaconis1_1981.pdf
98 // https :// citeseerx . ist .psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.650.2473
def computeBucketSize(data: DataFrame, colName: String ) : Double = {
100 val n = data .count
val quantiles = data . stat . approxQuantile (colName, Array (0.25, 0.75) , 0.25)
102 2.0 ∗ ( quantiles (1) − quantiles (0) ) / math.pow(n, 1.0/3)
}
104
// For Histogram data , compute the min and max buckets
106 def computeBucketEndPoints(data: DataFrame, colName: String ) : Seq[Double] = {
val bucketSize : Double = computeBucketSize(data: DataFrame, colName: String )
108 val minMaxVals = data.agg(min(colName), max(colName)).rdd.take (1) (0)
val minVal = minMaxVals.getDouble(0)
110 val maxVal = minMaxVals.getDouble(1)
val numBuckets: Integer = math. ceil ((maxVal − minVal)/ bucketSize ) . toInt





116 // For Histogram Data, map the rows to the correct bucket
def mapValueToBucketIndex(value: Double, leftBucketEndPoints : Seq[Double]): Integer = {
118 val numBuckets = leftBucketEndPoints . length
def leftInclusiveIndex ( i : Integer = 0) : Integer = {
120 if ( i >= numBuckets − 1) numBuckets − 1 // return last bucket index
else if ( leftBucketEndPoints ( i ) <= value && value < leftBucketEndPoints ( i + 1)) i





// For Histogram Data, udf to map row values to bucket index
128 def mapValueToBucketIndexUDF(leftBucketEndPoints: Seq[Double]): UserDefinedFunction = {
udf{v: Double => mapValueToBucketIndex(v, leftBucketEndPoints )}
130 }
132 // Next three functions are used to remove DNS servers from the dataset
// using string matching from the right side of the string for the length of the string to be
matched.
134
// return a boolean, true if the strings match, false otherwise
136 def ipFilter (s : String , endPart : String ) : Boolean = {
s . takeRight (( endPart . length ) ) == endPart
138 }
140 // returns true if any string matches any part of the sequence
def ipFilterSeq (s : String , endPartSeq: Seq[String ]) : Boolean = {
142 val intSeq = endPartSeq.map(ep => bool2int ( ipFilter (s , ep)) )
intSeq .sum > 0
144 }
146 // get a boolean to match strings udf section of above
def ipFilterSeqUDFfactory (endPartSeq: Seq[String ]) : UserDefinedFunction = {
148 udf{(s : String ) => ipFilterSeq (s , endPartSeq)}
}
150
// Next three functions are used to remove non−internal traffic from the dataset
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152 // using string matching from the left side of the string
154 // return a boolean, true if the strings match, false otherwise
def beginingStringFilter (s : String , startString : String ) : Boolean = {
156 s . startsWith ( startString )
}
158
// returns true if any string matches any part of the sequence
160 def stringFilterSeq (s : String , stringSeq : Seq[String ]) : Boolean = {
val intSeq = stringSeq .map(ep => bool2int ( beginingStringFilter (s , ep)) )
162 intSeq .sum > 0
}
164
// get a boolean to match strings udf section of above
166 def beginingStringSeqUDFfactory( stringSeq : Seq[String ]) : UserDefinedFunction = {
udf{(s : String ) => stringFilterSeq (s , stringSeq )}
168 }
170 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// Load the Dataset into the DataFrame
172 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
174 // Uses the read function to load the dataset into a dataframe
// Read in the CSV files
176 val df = read( dataSet )
178 // Remove Null Values
// Removes all irrelevant null values , outputs a count of the original
180 // and post removal rows, and computes the percentage of rows lost
182 // count all and nulls in dataset
val originalCount : Float = df .count ()
184 val countNull = df .where(’ ip_src . isNull ) .groupBy(’ip_src ) . count ()
186 // remove all rows with null values from the dataset
val pstDrop = df .na.drop()
188 val df = pstDrop // must seperate this line with the above ...
val postNullRemove: Float = df .count ()
190 // Calculate the percent dropped based on null values in rows
val percentDrop: Float = (( originalCount − postNullRemove) ∗ 100) / originalCount
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// Remove DNS Servers
194 // The shape of the traffic originating from DNS servers is very different
// from what originates from normal network users . This cell removes all
196 // IP addresses , ie , DNS Servers and their traffic , that are part of the
// sequence declared in the Parameter cell .
198
// drop DNS servers from the data
200
// Create a UDF val from the UDF factory to apply to the dataset
202 val DNSServerFilterUDF: UserDefinedFunction = ipFilterSeqUDFfactory ( serverIPSeq )
204 // Remove all true rows of the column "isDNSserver" from the dataset
val noDNSServers = df.withColumn("isDNSserver",
206 DNSServerFilterUDF(col(ip_src.name))) . filter (! col ("isDNSserver"
))
208 // Drop the unneeded boolean column from the dataset
val df = noDNSServers.drop("isDNSserver")
210
// Remove Non−internal traffic
212 // The focus of the feature generation is detecting anomalies originating
// from hosts within the internal network. If the source IP address is not
214 // from a internal address , then we are assuming that it is not a host on
// the network and removing it in this step .
216
// Create a UDF val from the UDF factory to apply to the dataset
218 val networkFilterUDF: UserDefinedFunction = beginingStringSeqUDFfactory( internalTraffic )
220 // Remove all false rows of the column " insideTraffic " from the dataset
val noOutsideTraffic = df .withColumn(" insideTraffic " ,
222 networkFilterUDF(col( ip_src .name))) . filter ( col ("
insideTraffic ") )
224 // Drop the unneeded boolean column from the dataset
val df = noOutsideTraffic .drop(" insideTraffic ")
226
228 // visualization code
val port_fiveThree = df .groupBy(ip_src .name, ip_dst .name,
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230 udp_srcport .name).agg(count( col ( ip_src .name)).as(" packets_total
") )
232 // sort a dataframe by source port from small to large
// and the count of packets from ip sources from large to small
234 val sorted = port_fiveThree . sort (asc("udp_srcport") , desc(" packets_total ") )




240 // Summary Statistics
// This cell calculates total average packet length per unique source IP
242 // address . Data also includes number of DNS packets and total data
// transmitted , sum of packet lengths , per unique IP source .
244 // This can be graphed as average packet length to DNS packet count or
// by total bytes transmitted per IP to name two options .
246 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
248 // Count sent DNS packets per unique IP source .
val packetCount = df . select (" ip_src " , " ip_dst "
250 ) .groupBy("ip_src"
) .agg(count( col (" ip_dst ")
252 ) . as("DNS_Packet_Count"))
254 // aggregate packet length by unique IP source .
val aggregatePacketLen = df . select (" ip_src " , "udp_len"
256 ) .groupBy("ip_src"
) .agg(sum(col("udp_len")
258 ) . as("DNS_Pkt_Len_Sum"))
260 // join the two dataframes together
val joinDF = packetCount. join (aggregatePacketLen ,Seq(" ip_src ") )
262
// take packetCount and the aggregation of udp_packet length and divide to find average
264 val totalAveragePacketLengthPerUniqueSourceIP = joinDF.withColumn("average_packet_len", toInt ($"
DNS_Pkt_Len_Sum" / $"DNS_Packet_Count"))
266 // Visualization code
69




272 // Add a Time Window to the Dataset
// Creates a time window that is leveraged for most features
274 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
276 // use the time window function to create a time window column and add it to the dataset
val dfWithWindows = df.withColumn(time_window, computeWindowUDF(col(frame_time_epoch.name))
)
278
// Frequency Distribution of Packet Sizes
280 // This feature takes unique source IP and calculates the frequency of
// packet size ranges over a time window. The packet size ranges are
282 // calculated based on the Freedman−Diaconis rule and referred to as bins .
284 // get data ready for histogram function by rounding all UDP Packet sizes
val dfUdpDouble = dfWithWindows.withColumn("udp_len_float", ($"udp_len" / 10)
286 ) .withColumn("udp_len_int", toInt ( col (" udp_len_float ") ) ) .drop(" udp_len_float
"
) .drop("udp_len"
288 ) .withColumn("udp_len_double", toDouble(col("udp_len_int") ) ) .drop("
udp_len_int")
290 // Compute the endpoints of the Histogram ’buckets ’ and map the rows to each ’bucket’
val bucketDF = mapValueToBucketIndexUDF(computeBucketEndPoints(dfUdpDouble, "udp_len_double"
))
292
// add the bucket column to the dataframe
294 val bktDF = dfUdpDouble.withColumn("udp_len_bucket",bucketDF(col("udp_len_double")))
296 // produces a dataframe that can be graphed to show frequency histogram of packets per bucket
val packetLengthHistogram = bktDF. select ("time_window", "udp_len_bucket", " ip_src "
298 ) . distinct .groupBy("udp_len_bucket"
) .agg(count( col (" ip_src ") ) . as("Packets_per_bucket ") )
300
302 // Visualization code
packetLengthHistogram.count
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304 packetLengthHistogram.orderBy(col ("udp_len_bucket") . asc) .show(10)
306 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// Packet Length Distribution and DNS Traffic Volume
308 // These features create a relationship between source IP addresses and
// packet length . Unique IP addresses were looked at over a window of time
310 // and their packet length was aggregated and added as a column to the data set .
// This feature is designed to help identify unique source IP addresses that
312 / /were sending high volumes of DNS traffic to a unique destination IP address .
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
314
// Aggregate sums of packet lengths and counts of packets per time windows.
316 val intermediateDF = dfWithWindows.groupBy(ip_src.name, time_window).agg(
sum(col(udp_len.name)).as("Sum_Packet_Length"),
318 count( col (udp_len.name)).as("Packet_Count")
)
320
// Compute and add the average packet length per unique source ip per time window to the dataset
.
322 val allFeaturesDF = intermediateDF.withColumn("average_packet_len", $"Sum_Packet_Length" / $"
Packet_Count")
324 // Visualization code
allFeaturesDF .count ()
326 allFeaturesDF .orderBy(col ("Packet_Count") .desc) .show()
328 // Summary Stats over Time Windows
// Circadian Rhythm Statistics
330
// aggregate packet volume by time window.





// aggregate average packet length by time window
338 val avgPacketSizeByTime = allFeaturesDF . select ("time_window", " average_packet_len "
) .groupBy("time_window"




// join the two dataframes together
344 val SumStatsOverTime = packetCountByTime.join(avgPacketSizeByTime,Seq("time_window"))
346 // total dataset packets
val totalPackets = SumStatsOverTime.select("Packet_Count_Over_Time"
348 ) .agg(sum(col("Packet_Count_Over_Time")







// Machine Learning Dataframe To CSV Conversion
358 // The transformed dataframes from above are converted to CSV files
// and put into S3 buckets for follow−on Machine Learning
360 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
362 // write files from the distributed file system to CSV files
364 // all the columns
allFeaturesDF . repartition (1) . write . format("com.databricks . spark .csv"
366 ) . option ("header" , " true "
) .mode("overwrite"
368 ) . save( packetFeaturesPath )
370 // Visualization Dataframe to CSV Conversion
// The transformed dataframes from above are converted to CSV files
372 // and put into S3 buckets for follow−on visualization
374 // write files from the distributed file system to CSV files
376
// Summary stat dataframe for whole dataset per packet
378 totalAveragePacketLengthPerUniqueSourceIP . coalesce (1) . write . format("com.databricks . spark .csv"






384 packetLengthHistogram.coalesce (1) . write . format("com.databricks . spark .csv"
) . option ("header" , " true "
386 ) .mode("overwrite"
) . save( packetHistPath )
388
SumStatsOverTime.coalesce(1). write . format("com.databricks . spark .csv"
390 ) . option ("header" , " true "
) .mode("overwrite"
392 ) . save(TimeWindowSummaryStatsPath)
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2 #∗ File Name: Machine Learning and Inference Pipeline using
#Batch Transform
4 #∗ Description : Trains the model on SageMaker and uses Batch
#Transform to score the data .
6 #∗ Language: Python
#∗ Author: LT Michael Laws (michael . laws@nps.edu)
8 #∗ Contributor : LT Greg Bunder (greg.bunder@nps.edu)
#∗ Thesis Advisor: Dr. Vinnie Monaco (vinnie.monaco@nps.edu)
10 #∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
12 # Imports







20 from sagemaker import RandomCutForest





import numpy as np
28 import pandas as pd
30 # Parameter Definitions
# Configurable parameters to allow for ease of changing program functionality to include
SageMaker and S3 Bucket Configuration
32
# S3 bucket parameters for Sagemaker and datasets
34 bucket = ’bucket’ # NPS Specific Value Scrubbed
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36 # ML S3 Prefixes
datasetPrefix = ’MLpipeline/ PacketFeatures / allFeatures ’
38 ML_prefix = ’MLpipeline/RCF/AllFeatures’
batch_prefix = ’MLpipeline/PacketFeaturesBatch ’
40 batch_results_prefix = ’MLpipeline/PacketFeaturesBatch / inferenceResults ’
42 # The location of the batch dataset
batch_input = ’s3 ://{}/{}/ batch / ’ . format(bucket , batch_prefix )
44
# The location to store the results of the batch transform job
46 batch_output = ’s3 ://{}/{}/ inferenceResults ’ . format(bucket , batch_prefix )
48 # Train / validate / batch split files
train_file = ’ train_data .csv’
50 test_file = ’ test_data .csv’
batch_file = ’ batch_data .csv’
52
# variable that is used split the files to remain under batch transform limits
54 row_max = 120000
56 # configure the column names for ML and Inference
columnsForDF = ["ip_src" , "time_window", "Sum_Packet_Length", "Packet_Count", "
average_packet_len "]
58 inferColumn = [" ip_src " , "time_window", "Sum_Packet_Length", "Packet_Count", " average_packet_len
" , "score"]
60 # SageMaker Startup
execution_role = sagemaker. get_execution_role ()
62 sess = sagemaker.Session () # set up the sagemaker session to handle API interactions
input_mode="File"
64
# check if the SageMaker bucket exists − code from https :// github .com/awslabs/amazon−sagemaker
−examples
66 try :
boto3.Session () . client ( ’s3’ ) .head_bucket(Bucket=bucket)
68 except botocore . exceptions . ParamValidationError as e:
print ( ’Hey! You either forgot to specify your S3 bucket’
70 ’ or you gave your bucket an invalid name!’)
except botocore . exceptions . ClientError as e:
76
72 if e . response[ ’Error ’ ][ ’Code’] == ’403’:
print ("Hey! You don’t have permission to access the bucket , {}." . format(bucket) )
74 elif e . response[ ’Error ’ ][ ’Code’] == ’404’:




print ( ’ Training input / output will be stored in : s3 ://{}/{} ’ . format(bucket , ML_prefix))
80
# Defines
82 #Functions Supporting operations




88 return int ( ipaddress . IPv4Address(row))
except :
90 return (0)
92 # convert ip integer to string
def int2ipstring (int_row) :
94 try :




# split and put dataframes into S3 as csv files
100 def csv_to_s3(df , filename , keyPrefix , max_rows):
dataframes = []
102 while len (df) > max_rows:






for _, frame in enumerate(dataframes) :
110 fileUpload = str (_)+ filename # ex:’1 batch_data .csv’
frame. to_csv( fileUpload , index=False , header=False)
77
112 boto3.Session () . resource ( ’s3’ ) .Bucket(bucket) .Object(os . path . join ( keyPrefix , fileUpload )
) . upload_file ( fileUpload )
#sess . upload_data( batch_file , bucket=bucket, key_prefix=keyPrefix . format( batch_prefix ) )
114 print ( ’S3 location : ’ + bucket + ’ / ’ + keyPrefix )
116 # get files from S3 to read into dataframes
def get_csv_output_from_s3(bucket , prefix ) :
118 s3 = boto3. resource ( ’s3’ )
obj = s3.Object(bucket , ’{}’ . format( prefix ) )
120 print (obj)
return obj . get () ["Body"].read () .decode(’ utf−8’)
122
# get a single dataframe from at least one file in a S3 bucket by passing a bucket and a prefix .
124 # functionality is different than the S3SF method and is needed for handling CSV nuances
def pull_and_concat_from_s3(bucket , prefix ) :
126 fileList = sess . list_s3_files (bucket , prefix )
df = []
128 for _, file in enumerate( fileList ) :
output = get_csv_output_from_s3(bucket , file )
130 try : # deal with the "_SUCCESS" file from Scala/Spark
df .append(pd.read_csv( io . StringIO(output ) , sep="," , header=None, low_memory=False))
132 except :
continue
134 #print ( file )
df = pd.concat(df , axis=0, ignore_index=True)
136 return df
138 # return a single dataframe from a bucket / prefix combo from S3. Using S3FS keeps the datatypes
more useable than pd.read
def pull_and_concat_from_s3_using_S3SF(bucket, prefix ) :
140 fileList = sess . list_s3_files (bucket , prefix )
df = []
142 # use S3FS to get the dataset into a dataframe
for _, file in enumerate( fileList ) :
144 fs = s3fs .S3FileSystem()
dataset = ’s3 :// ’ + bucket + ’ / ’ + file
146 with fs .open( dataset , ’rb’ ) as f :
try : # deal with the "_SUCCESS" file from Scala/Spark




print ( file )
152 df = pd.concat(df , axis=0, ignore_index=True, sort =False)
return df
154
# Load the Dataset into the DataFrame
156 # Ensure datatypes are correct
158 df = pull_and_concat_from_s3_using_S3SF(bucket, datasetPrefix )
df .columns = columnsForDF
160
# change IP addresses from objects to integers .
162 # For the ML model to process the data , all the datatypes in the dataframe need to be numerical .
df[ ’ ip_src ’]=df[ ’ ip_src ’ ]. apply( ipstring2int )
164
# Split and Export Data
166 #Split the dataset into three sets ; training , testing , and validation for batch inference .
rand_split = np.random.rand(len(df) )
168 train_list = rand_split < 0.8 # train on 80% of the data
test_list = ( rand_split >= 0.8) & ( rand_split < 0.9)
170 batch_list = rand_split >= 0.8 # validate /use 20% of the data
172 # get the training data into its own dataframe and uploaded into S3. Leave it in one file
df_train = df[ train_list ]
174 df_train . to_csv( train_file , index=False ,header=False)
sess . upload_data( train_file , bucket=bucket, key_prefix=’{}/ train ’ . format( batch_prefix ) )
176 print ( ’S3 location : ’ + bucket + ’ / ’ + ’{}/ train ’ . format( batch_prefix ) )
178 # put validation data into S3 and break it up
df_test = df[ test_list ]
180 csv_to_s3( df_test , test_file , ’{}/ test ’ . format( batch_prefix ) , row_max)
182 # break up batch infer data into chunks and upload to S3
df_batch = df[ batch_list ]
184 csv_to_s3(df_batch , batch_file , ’{}/batch’ . format( batch_prefix ) , row_max)
186 # Train the model
#Load the values from the training data and train the model.
188 #https :// sagemaker.readthedocs . io /en/ stable / randomcutforest .html
# specify general training job information and create the rcf object
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190 rcf = RandomCutForest(role=execution_role ,
train_instance_count =1,
192 train_instance_type =’ml.m4.xlarge’ ,
data_location =’s3 ://{}/{}/ train ’ . format(bucket , batch_prefix ) ,





# get the data into the record_set format for rcf
200 train_data = rcf . record_set ( df_train . values , labels =None, channel=’ train ’ , encrypt=False)
202 # train on the dataset
rcf . fit ( train_data )
204 print ( ’ Training job name: {}’ . format( rcf . latest_training_job . job_name))
206 # Batch Inference
#Use Sagemaker’s Batch Transform functionality to rapidly score the whole dataset and store the
results in S3
208 #https :// sagemaker.readthedocs . io /en/ stable / transformer .html
210 # set up the rcf_transformer as a callable object
rcf_transformer = rcf . transformer ( instance_count =1, instance_type =’ml.m4.xlarge’ , output_path=
batch_output)
212
# content_type / accept and split_type / assemble_with are required to use IO joining feature
214 rcf_transformer .assemble_with = ’Line’
rcf_transformer . accept = ’ text /csv’
216
# Execute the transform job on the batch dataset in the S3 bucket
218 rcf_transformer . transform (data=batch_input , data_type=’S3Prefix ’ , content_type=’ text /csv’ ,





2 #∗ File Name: Visualization Pipeline
#∗ Description : Takes the dataset and visualizes the information .
4 #∗ Language: Python
#∗ Author: LT Michael Laws (michael . laws@nps.edu)
6 #∗ Contributor : LT Greg Bunder (greg.bunder@nps.edu)
#∗ Thesis Advisor: Dr. Vinnie Monaco (vinnie.monaco@nps.edu)
8 #∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
10 # Amazon Specific
import s3fs # load files from S3
12 import boto3 # also load files from S3




18 import ipaddress # convert ip address object to int
import pandas as pd # handle dataframes
20 import plotly . express as px # handle visualizations
import plotly . graph_objects as go
22
# Defines
24 #Functions Supporting operations




30 return int ( ipaddress . IPv4Address(row))
except :
32 return (0)
34 # convert ip integer to string
def int2ipstring (int_row) :
81
36 try :




# split and put dataframes into S3 as csv files
42 def csv_to_s3(df , filename , keyPrefix , max_rows):
dataframes = []
44 while len (df) > max_rows:





50 for _, frame in enumerate(dataframes) :
fileUpload = str (_)+ filename # ex:’1 batch_data .csv’
52 frame. to_csv( fileUpload , index=False , header=False)
boto3.Session () . resource ( ’s3’ ) .Bucket(bucket) .Object(os . path . join ( keyPrefix , fileUpload )
) . upload_file ( fileUpload )
54 print ( ’S3 location : ’ + bucket + ’ / ’ + keyPrefix )
56
# get files from S3 to read into dataframes
58 def get_csv_output_from_s3(bucket , prefix ) :
s3 = boto3. resource ( ’s3’ )
60 obj = s3.Object(bucket , ’{}’ . format( prefix ) )
print (obj)
62 return obj . get () ["Body"].read () .decode(’ utf−8’)
64 # get a single dataframe from at least one file in a S3 bucket by passing a bucket and a prefix .
# functionality is different than the S3SF method and is needed for handling CSV nuances
66 def pull_and_concat_from_s3(bucket , prefix ) :
df = []
68 for key in get_matching_s3_keys(bucket=bucket, prefix =prefix ) :
output = get_csv_output_from_s3(bucket , key)
70 try : # deal with the "_SUCCESS" file from Scala/Spark





df = pd.concat(df , axis=0, ignore_index=True)
76 return df
78 # return a single dataframe from a bucket / prefix combo from S3. Using S3FS keeps the datatypes
more useable than pd.read
def pull_and_concat_from_s3_using_S3SF(bucket, prefix ) :
80 df = []
for key in get_matching_s3_keys(bucket=bucket, prefix =prefix ) :
82 # use s3fs to get the dataset into a dataframe
fs = s3fs .S3FileSystem()
84 dataset = ’s3 :// ’ + bucket + ’ / ’ + key
with fs .open( dataset , ’rb’ ) as f :
86 try : # deal with the "_SUCCESS" file from Scala/Spark








96 Copyright (c) 2012−2019 Alex Chan
98 https :// alexwlchan . net /2019/07/ listing −s3−keys/
https :// github .com/alexwlchan/alexwlchan . net /blob/9a80d17de47b130772bb5433592e8fffd1d18118/
LICENSE
100
Permission is hereby granted , free of charge , to any person obtaining a
102 copy of this software and associated documentation files ( the "Software") ,
to deal in the Software without restriction , including without limitation
104 the rights to use , copy, modify, merge, publish , distribute , sublicense ,
and/or sell copies of the Software , and to permit persons to whom the Software
106 is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions :
108 The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
all copies or substantial portions of the Software .
110
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
112 IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
83
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
114 THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR
OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE,
116 ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR




def get_matching_s3_objects (bucket , prefix ="", suffix ="") :
122 """
Generate objects in an S3 bucket .
124
:param bucket : Name of the S3 bucket .
126 :param prefix : Only fetch objects whose key starts with
this prefix ( optional ) .
128 :param suffix : Only fetch objects whose keys end with
this suffix ( optional ) .
130 """
s3 = boto3. client ("s3")
132 paginator = s3. get_paginator (" list_objects_v2 ")
134 kwargs = {’Bucket’ : bucket}
136 # We can pass the prefix directly to the S3 API. If the user has passed
# a tuple or list of prefixes , we go through them one by one.
138 if isinstance ( prefix , str ) :




for key_prefix in prefixes :
144 kwargs[" Prefix "] = key_prefix
146 for page in paginator . paginate(∗∗kwargs):
try :
148 contents = page["Contents"]
except KeyError:
150 break
152 for obj in contents :
84
key = obj["Key"]
154 if key.endswith( suffix ) :
yield obj
156
def get_matching_s3_keys(bucket , prefix ="", suffix ="") :
158 """
Generate the keys in an S3 bucket .
160
:param bucket : Name of the S3 bucket .
162 :param prefix : Only fetch keys that start with this prefix ( optional ) .
:param suffix : Only fetch keys that end with this suffix ( optional ) .
164 """
for obj in get_matching_s3_objects (bucket , prefix , suffix ) :
166 yield obj["Key"]
168 # Parameter Definitions
# Configurable parameters to allow for ease of changing program functionality
170 # to include column headers and S3 Bucket Configuration
172 # S3 bucket parameters for Sagemaker and datasets
bucket = ’bucket’ # NPS Specific Value Scrubbed
174
# Visualization S3 prefixes
176 packetHistogramPrefix = ’ Visualizations /packetHistogramData’
summaryStatsPrefix = ’ Visualizations / summaryStatistics ’
178 TimeWindowSummaryStatsPrefix = ’Visualizations/TimeWindowSummaryStats’
180 # ML results S3 Prefixes
datasetPrefix = ’MLpipeline/ PacketFeatures / allFeatures ’
182 ML_prefix = ’MLpipeline/RCF/AllFeatures’
batch_prefix = ’MLpipeline/PacketFeaturesBatch ’
184 batch_results_prefix = ’MLpipeline/PacketFeaturesBatch / inferenceResults ’
186 # The location of the batch dataset
batch_input = ’s3 ://{}/{}/ batch / ’ . format(bucket , batch_prefix )
188
# The location to store the results of the batch transform job
190 batch_output = ’s3 ://{}/{}/ inferenceResults ’ . format(bucket , batch_prefix )
192 # Train / validate / batch split files
85
train_file = ’ train_data .csv’
194 test_file = ’ test_data .csv’
batch_file = ’ batch_data .csv’
196
# Dataframe Columns for graphing
198 histogramColumn = ["Frequency Counts of DNS Packet Sizes over Time Window","Packet Counts"]
columnsForGraphALLFeatures = ["IP Source", "Time Window", "Packet Length Sum", "Packet Count", "
Average Packet Length"]
200 summaryStatsColumn = ["IP Source", "Packet Count", "Packet Length Sum", "Average Packet Length"]
inferColumn = ["IP Source", "Time Window", "Packet Length Sum", "Packet Count", "Average Packet
Length", "Anomaly Score"]
202
# Visualization of Entire Dataset
204 #General Statistics to show that the traffic is representative of normal network traffic .
206 # this cell takes and visualizes the histogram output from the Scala feature pipeline .
histDF = pull_and_concat_from_s3_using_S3SF(bucket, packetHistogramPrefix )
208 histDF.columns = histogramColumn
210 # data is flat > 50
histDF = histDF[histDF[’Frequency Counts of DNS Packet Sizes over Time Window’] < 50]
212
# need to sort values by bucket
214 histDF = histDF. sort_values (by=[’Frequency Counts of DNS Packet Sizes over Time Window’])
216 #This feature takes unique source IP and calculates the frequency of packet
# size ranges over a time window. The packet size ranges are calculated based on
218 # the Freedman−Diaconis rule and referred to as bins .
220 fig = px. line (histDF, x="Frequency Counts of DNS Packet Sizes over Time Window", y="Packet
Counts")
fig .update_xaxes( ticks =" inside ")
222 fig .update_yaxes( ticks =" inside " , col=1)
fig . update_layout (
224 title ="Histogram of Packet Sizes" ,







# load Dataframe from S3
232 summaryStatsDF = pull_and_concat_from_s3_using_S3SF(bucket, summaryStatsPrefix)
# add columns to dataframe
234 summaryStatsDF.columns = summaryStatsColumn
# convert IP addresses to integers
236 summaryStatsDF[’IP Source’]=summaryStatsDF[’IP Source’].apply( ipstring2int )
# sort integers
238 summaryStatsDF = summaryStatsDF.sort_values(by=’IP Source’, ascending=False)
# convert back to dotted decimal ip address
240 summaryStatsDF[’IP Source’]=summaryStatsDF[’IP Source’].apply( int2ipstring )
summaryStatsDF.info()
242
# Total Data Transmitted
244 #This graph represents the total amount of data that was sent from
# individual source IP addresses over the dataset .
246
fig = px. scatter (summaryStatsDF, x="IP Source", y="Packet Length Sum")
248 fig .update_xaxes( ticks =" inside ")
fig .update_yaxes( ticks =" inside " , col=1)
250 fig . update_layout ( title ="Packet Length Sum over IP Source ")
fig .show()
252
# Summary Stats over Time Windows
254 #Visualize Circadian Rhythm




260 # Visualize Traffic Flow over Time Windows
data= TimeWindowSummaryStatsDF
262 fig = make_subplots(rows=2, cols=1,
shared_xaxes=True,
264 vertical_spacing =0.02,
subplot_titles =(" " ,










) , row=1, col=1)
276





282 name="Avg Packet Size"
) , row=2, col=1)
284
#fig .update_xaxes( title_text ="Time Window", row=1, col=1)
286 fig .update_xaxes( title_text ="Time Windows", row=2, col=1)
fig .update_yaxes( title_text ="Packet Counts", row=1, col=1)
288 fig .update_yaxes( title_text ="Average Packet Length", row=2, col=1)
290 fig . update_layout ( height=600, width=1000,
legend_orientation ="h",
292 showlegend = False ,
title_text ="Packet Counts and Average Packet Length per 10 minute Time
Window")
294 fig .show()
296 # Visualize using the features over time windows
# Histogram of Average Packet Counts over Time Windows
298 # load Dataframe from S3
allFeaturesDF = pull_and_concat_from_s3_using_S3SF(bucket, datasetPrefix )
300
allFeaturesDF . info ()
302 allFeaturesDF .sample(20)
304 # histfunc = [’ count ’, ’sum’, ’avg ’, ’min’, ’max’]





# sort data by time window score
310 data = data . sort_values (by=[’time_window’]) #, ascending=False)
312
fig = px.histogram(data , x="time_window", y="Packet_Count", histfunc =’avg’)
314
fig . update_layout (
316 title ="Histogram of Average Packet Counts over Time Windows",
xaxis_title ="Time Window",





324 # Visualize with anomaly scores
# Get the scored data from S3 then pull the anomalous data above
326 # a certain threshold into a new dataframe for easier analysis .
328 # Pull Transformed data from S3
inferDF = pull_and_concat_from_s3(bucket , batch_results_prefix )
330
inferColumn = ["IP Source", "Time Window", "Packet Length Sum", "Packet Count", "Average Packet
Length", "score"]
332 inferDF.columns = inferColumn
inferDF = inferDF. astype ({"Average Packet Length": int , "score" : int })
334 inferDF[ ’IP Source’]=inferDF[ ’IP Source’ ]. apply( int2ipstring )
# sort the data based on time. Aids in visualizing the seperate IP addresses
336 inferDF = inferDF. sort_values (by=[’Time Window’], ascending=True)
# calculate score cuttofs for easier visualzation
338 score_mean = inferDF. score .mean()
score_std = inferDF. score . std ()
340 score_cutoff = score_mean + 5∗score_std
342
# fix columns





# Add Anomalies to the visualizations
348 # make a new dataframe with just data that we care about
df_anomalous = inferDF[inferDF[ ’Anomaly Score’] > score_cutoff ]
350
# Anomalous Data Visualization
352 #We isolated the anomalous data above a certain threshold in the
# previous cell and in the next cells we visually represent




# Percent of data that is anomalous
360 #Calculate what percent of data after removing everything below the score
# cutoff will be used in the following graphs .
362
percentAnomalous = (len (df_anomalous) / len (inferDF) )∗100
364 percentAnomalous
366
# Visual representation of how the ML algorithm scored the Packet Length Sum Feature
368
# feature graphed over the anomaly score
370 data= inferDF
fig = go.Figure(data=go. Scattergl (x=data[’Anomaly Score’],





text =data[ ’Anomaly Score’],
378 hoverinfo=" all ") )
380 fig . update_layout (
title ="Packet Length Sum from IP address within each Time Window over Anomaly Scores",
382 xaxis_title ="Anomaly Score",




388 # same graph but time window over the feature
data = inferDF
390
fig = go.Figure(data=go. Scattergl (x=data[’Time Window’],





text =data[ ’Anomaly Score’],
398 hoverinfo=" all ") )
400 fig . update_layout (
title ="Packet Length Sum from IP address within each Time Window colored by Anomaly Scores"
,
402 xaxis_title ="Time Window",
yaxis_title ="Packet Length Sum",
404 )
406 fig .show()
408 # 3D representation of anomalous IP Source addresses over time windows
fig = px. scatter_3d (df_anomalous,









420 # tight layout
fig . update_layout (margin=dict( l=0, r=0, b=0, t=0))
422 fig . update_layout (legend=dict (x=.85, y=.99))
fig . update_layout ( legend_title =’Score Legend’)
424 fig . update_layout (legend={’ traceorder ’ : ’ reversed ’})
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426 fig .show()
428 # Histogram of Source IP addresses by Anomaly Score
# To provide the best value to the watchstander and network operator ,
430 # providing a summary list of IP addresses to follow up on seems to provide
# the most easily digestable data . The below graph demonstrates that only
432 # a few IP addresses out of the original list of thousands show above the baseline .
434 # save our original dataframe
data = df_anomalous
436
# histfunc = [’ count ’, ’sum’, ’avg ’, ’min’, ’max’]
438 # histnorm = [’’, ’ percent ’, ’ probability ’, ’ density ’, ’ probability density ’]
440 # OPTIONAL CODE FOR CHART READABILITY
# sort data by anomaly score
442 data = data . sort_values (by=[’Anomaly Score’], ascending=False)
# do the above so we can get rid of the low scorers
444 data = data . iloc [:1300]
# END OPTIONAL CODE
446 fig = px.histogram(data , x="IP Source", y="Anomaly Score", histnorm=’ probability density ’ )
448 fig . update_layout (
title ="Normalized Probability Density of Anomaly Scores by IP Source over Time Windows",
450 xaxis_title ="IP Source",
yaxis_title ="Normalized Anomaly Score"
452 )
454 fig .show()
456 # This graph is slightly different than the previous
# as a groupby and aggregate is done over the anomaly scores first
458
# aggregate scores by ip address over time window.
460 dfA = df_anomalous.groupby([’Time Window’, ’IP Source’ ]) .agg({





# flatten the dataframe from multiindex
466 dfA = pd.DataFrame(dfA.to_records () )
468 # [’ count ’, ’sum’, ’avg ’, ’min’, ’max’]
# histnorm = [’’, ’ percent ’, ’ probability ’, ’ density ’, ’ probability density ’]
470 fig = px.histogram(df1 , x="IP Source", y="Anomaly Score", histnorm=’ probability density ’ ) #
histfunc =’avg’)
472 fig . update_layout (
title ="Normalized Probability Density of Aggregated Anomaly Scores by IP Source over Time
Windows",
474 xaxis_title ="IP Source",
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